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Abstract
Using multilevel modeling of state-level economic data and individual-level exit poll
data from the 1994, 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections, we find that income
has a stronger effect in predicting the vote for the conservative party in poorer states
than in richer states—a pattern that has also been found in recent U.S. elections. In
addition (and unlike in the U.S.), richer states on average tend to support the conser-
vative party at higher rates than poorer states. Our findings raise questions regarding
the role that income polarization and region play in vote choice. The electoral results
since 1994 reveal that collapsing multiple states into large regions entails significant loss
of information that otherwise may uncover sharper and quiet revealing differences in
voting patterns between rich and poor states as well as rich and poor individuals within
states.
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1 Introduction
“The electorate is genuinely divided and the close election underlines it. Many
are opting for a change while many are opting for continuity.”1 (Dresser 2006)
“Yesterday, the electorate confirmed a regional division in which the north and
north-west parts of the country favored Felipe Caldero´n, while the center and
south supported Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez Obrador at higher rates.”2 (Reforma
2006)
“The only thing that the election shows is that social polarization is not a
children’s story and less an invention. This polarization is a reality.. . . It is or
it seems to be the legitimization of the fight between the rich and the poor.”3
(Alema´n 2006)
“The new map depicts an industrialized north, where business ties to the United
States have played an enormous role in the rise of the right-leaning, conservative
party, and a more agricultural south that is a hotbed of leftist discontent and
anti-globalization sentiment.” (McKinley 2006)
The conservative candidate from the National Action Party (PAN) won the most con-
tested presidential election in Mexico’s modern times by a margin of 0.6% over the leftist
candidate from the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and almost 14% over the
“catchall” candidate from the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). One thing was evi-
dent from election day: the presidential vote was geographically divided, with the states of
the north and center-west supporting the PAN and the states of the center and the south
supporting the PRD. In other words, the electoral result was characterized by a divide
between rich and poor states. This pattern was strikingly clear in 2006 –not so in the two
previous presidential elections of 1994 and 2000– but, as we shall see, this it is not a simple
aggregation of rich voters supporting the conservative candidate and poor voters supporting
the left-wing candidate.
What happened in the 1994, 2000, and 2006 presidential elections? Does living in a rich
or poor state change individual vote preferences–that is, does geography matter for voting
behavior? Why geography now matters more than ever? Why explaining the presidential
1“El electorado esta´ genuinamente dividido y la eleccio´n apretada lo subraya. Muchos optan por el cambio
y muchos optan por la continuidad.”
2“Los electores confirmaron, el d´ıa de ayer, una divisio´n regional en la que el norte y centro-occidente del
Pa´ıs favorecieron a Felipe Caldero´n, mientras que las regiones centro y sur se manifestaron ma´s por Andre´s
Manuel Lo´pez Obrador.”
3“Lo u´nico que muestra es que la polarizacio´n social no es un cuento y menos un invento. Esa polarizacio´n
es una realidad.. . . Es o parece ser la legitimacio´n de la lucha de pobres contra ricos.”
2
electoral outcomes entails bringing the ‘states’ back in? We try to answer these questions
by analyzing the relation between income and vote choice at the state and individual level
on the outcome of the 1994, 2000 and 2006 Mexican presidential elections.
Each of the past three Mexican presidential elections illustrate a breaking point in Mex-
ico’s political history, which must be accounted for when interpreting the electoral returns.
The 1994 presidential election can be characterized as the election of “fear.” Events such
as the Zapatista uprising , the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio (the PRI presidential
candidate), and NAFTA contextualized the election. Many scholars, as well as journalists
(Loaeza 1999), have argued that the PRI took advantage of these events in a huge mar-
keting campaign suggesting that the country needed experience and continuity and not a
new political party with no governing experience. The 2000 presidential election, the elec-
tion of “change”, can be considered as the apogee of Mexico’s democratic transition4 that
started in the late 1970s with the first comprehensive electoral reform (Becerra, Salazar
& Woldenberg 2000, Lujambio 1997, Ochoa-Reza 2004). Finally, the 2006 election has
been portrayed as the election in which political entrepreneurs tried to capitalize on the
socioeconomic and regional cleavages that, to some extent, became more evident during the
1990s with the political and economic reforms and exacerbated by the economic crisis of
that decade. Others argue that the results of the 2006 election highlight voters’ percep-
tions of the inherent risk associated with each candidate as well as with their personalities
(Beltran Forthcoming). In economic terms, the 2006 presidential election can be qualified
as the election of the “neoliberals” versus the “neopopulists,” the “elite” versus the “popu-
lace”, the PAN representing the right (fiscally and culturally conservative) versus the PRD
representing a “Kafkanian” left, with the PRI somewhere in the middle and swinging left
and right contingent upon which group won the internal hegemony.
Given each party’s foundational myths, and the polarizing rhetoric used during the
campaign, one could anticipate that under fair electoral conditions,5 the PAN would capture
the votes of the conservative middle-class and of the rich; while, given the backlash of
neoliberal policies in other Latin American countries, it seemed plausible that the PRD
would assure the vote of the less aﬄuent voters. Mexican political pundits in the months
4“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political proce-
dures to produce an elected, government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a
free and popular vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when
the executive, legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power
with other bodies de jure.” (Linz & Stepan 1996, p. 3)
5According to Freedom House in 1994 Mexico was a “partly free” country and a free country in political
and civil liberties since the year 2000.
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preceding the election criticized the PAN candidate, Felipe Calderon, for being unable to
articulate a message that would also address the concerns of large sectors of the population
that had been hurt by the neoliberal economic model (Dresser 2005). Now, given Mexico’s
socioeconomic conditions and the numeric superiority of less aﬄuent voters, many believed
that the PRD could overwhelmingly win a national election such as the 2006 presidential
election; however, as we all know, the PRD did not win. So, did richer voters support the
PAN candidate and poorer voters support the PRD or the PRI?
Studies of the Mexican presidential elections have found that political factors such as
party identification, the content of political campaigns, the notion of regime change, and
the pro and anti-regime divide in the electorate proved to better account for the variation
in voting behavior than socio-demographic variables or even the left-right ideological divi-
sion within the electorate (see the edited volume by Dominguez & Lawson 2004). While
income is often included as a control, and the positive link between income and support
for the conservative party is almost always noted in multivariate analyses (for example, see
Klesner 1995, Dominguez & McCann 1996, Moreno 2003, Dominguez & Lawson 2004), the
connection between income and vote choice has not been analyzed when geography is taken
into account.
In this paper, we find that, on average, individual income matters more in poorer states
than in richer states—a similar pattern as found by Gelman, Shor, Bafumi & Park (2007)
and Gelman, Park, Shor, Bafumi & Cortina (2008) in analyzing U.S. electoral data. The
difference in voting patterns between rich and poor individuals is greater in rich states than
in poor states. At the aggregate level, however, the conservative party (PAN) does better
in richer states (in terms of GDP per capita) than in poorer states—unlike in the United
States, where the Republicans have in recent years performed better in the poor states.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the state-level
presidential results for the 1994, 2000 and 2006 elections, Sections 3 and 4 describe our
methods and results, and we discuss our findings in Section 5.
2 Geography and the vote
2.1 Geography matters: Mexico’s political mosaic
Mexico is a country of geographically and ethnically diverse traditions and cultures. Just
as the cuisine changes considerably all over the territory, income, state development and
individual political preferences change dramatically from one Mexican state to another. For
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instance, the GDP per capita of the richest state (Mexico, D.F.) is more than six times than
that of the poorest state (Chiapas). Similar differences are found in other realms such as
health and education (PNUD 2003). Politically, nowadays Mexico can be defined as an
ideologically polarized tripartite party system. On the left of the political spectrum, we
find the PRD, the party of the “clase popular” (i.e., the poor); on the right is the PAN, the
party of the middle class; and in a blurry center is the PRI, the former ruling party. At the
individual level, public opinion and exit poll data show that voters of higher income and
socioeconomic status tend to support the PAN while the less aﬄuent tend to support the
PRD or the PRI (Moreno 2003, Klesner 2004, Reforma 2006). Figure 1 shows that at the
individual level, richer voters tend to support the conservative party in greater proportions


































Figure 1: For each of the three major parties, the vote share plotted vs. individual in-
come.7 On average, richer voters tend to support the conservative party (PAN) in greater
proportions than poorer voters
At the regional level, Figure 2 shows that the PAN has done better8 in the wealthier parts
of the country (center-west and north), and worse in Mexico City and the south(Klesner
2004, p.105).9 In contrast to the commonly held view of clear regional divisions between
PAN supporters and PRD/PRI supporters, that is, between the rich Northern and North-
western states v. the poor southern states, at this level of aggregation, however, the rela-
tionship between income and vote choice is not so clear. For instance, the average GDP
8Although the PRI won all the states in 1994 the official electoral results for the presidential election
confirm that the PAN did better in the center-west and northern regions of the country
9Adapting Klesner (2004), we define the regions as: north: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Coahuila,
Chihuahua, Durango, Nuevo Leon, San Luis Potosi, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas, Zacatecas; center-west :
Aguascalientes, Colima, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Michoacan, Nayarit, Queretaro; center : Estado de Mexico,
Hidalgo, Morelos, Puebla, Tlaxcala; south: Campeche, Chiapas, Guerrero, Oaxaca, Quintana Roo, Tabasco,
Veracruz, Yucatan. For our analyses, we consider the Federal District (Mexico, D.F.) as a separate state
from the rest of the Estado de Mexico.
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per capita10 in the regions won by the PAN in 2000 was $9,050, while the GDP per capita
in those regions where the PAN under-performed was $8,800 (PNUD 2003). At the state
level, a different picture emerges. The average GDP per capita in the states won by the
PAN was $10,200 for 2000 and $9,700 in 2006. In contrast, the GDP per capita in those
states won by the PRD was $4,800 in 2000 and $7,300 for 2006.
2.2 Context matters: Unpacking the vote in the 1994-2006 presidential
elections
Since 1988, each presidential election has been inscribed within major political and eco-
nomic processes. In this sense, the relationship between income and vote choice in the past
three presidential elections has to be situated within each election and its context, which
necessarily colors the perception of the choices offered by each party.
1994 was one of the most eventful years of Mexico’s modern economic and political
history. This year saw NAFTA coming into effect, the Zapatista uprising, and high profile
political assassinations. The unrolling of these events severely questioned the capacity of
the Mexican political system to advance towards full democracy in a non violent way. Main-
taining the country’s peace and stability and safeguarding the electoral process, therefore,
became the primordial goal of all political actors. The result was the acquiescence of the
PRI to collaborate and modify legal dispositions that would allow international and na-
tional individuals and organizations to function as electoral observers. These elections were
both, highly contested as well as the most closely watched, embedding the winner with a
newfound legitimacy through the popular mandate. The fear of violence and political chaos
favored the PRI that positioned itself as the only political party capable –with enough
governing experience– to manage the crisis, thus obtaining 49% of the vote. The media
collaborated with this image by launching what was later criticized as a “fear” campaign
(Scherlen 1998), that favored the PRI. The “fear” campaign hurt the PRD and gave some
leverage to the PAN: the former had an “unofficial” and ambivalent relationship with the Za-
patista Army, while the later championed peace and “orderly change” (Loaeza 1999, Tuiran
& Grobet 1995).
The general sentiment during the 2000 presidential election was that getting rid of the
PRI would solve almost all of Mexico’s problems regardless of their nature. 2000, the year
of “change” ended more than 71 years of the PRI’s political hegemony at the national
level. During this election a vast majority of the electorate voted for political alternation,


































































































Figure 2: States won by each of the political parties in the 1994, 2000 and 2006 elections.
White represents those states in which the PAN won, light gray represents those states won
by the PRI, and dark gray represents the states won by the PRD.
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ensuring however, a continuation of macroeconomic stability and also of social peace. After
the 1994 economic crisis the economy was probably one of the most salient issues during the
campaign. The PRI tried to take advantage of what it thought it would be a backlash of
neoliberal policies and its candidate assumed the most left-wing position a PRI candidate
had taken since the 1970’s. At the end, this strategy backfired for two reasons. First, it
alienated middle and high-income PRI voters who had been benefited by these policies.
Second, this issue was aptly lumped together by the PAN candidate who argued that the
economic situation was not so much the effect of neoliberal policies but due to an inefficient,
undemocratic and corrupt PRI government. The PAN strategy also hurt the PRD indirectly.
Many PRD supporters agreed that the main goal of their vote in that election was to get
rid of 71 years of PRI rule. The PAN obtained 43% of the vote followed by the PRI with
36% and again the PRD with 17% of the popular vote. For the first time in more than half
a Century an opposition party won the presidency.
The 2006 election has been portrayed as the most polarized, at least at the elite level
(Bruhn & Greene, 2007). However, key ideological differences between the parties’ platforms
that were present in the 1994 and 2000 elections seem to have eroded in 2006. In the
economic policy dimension, the PRD moved towards the center with respect to previous
elections. The group that won political hegemony within the PRD, alienated some of
its most left-wing bases as they criticized the party of becoming “a vehicle for the political
ambitions of many of the same politicians who surrounded Salinas” (Gilly 2006, p. 78). The
PAN also moved to the left of most neoliberal programs envisioned by the PRI for Mexico’s
rural sector. Instead of reducing expenditures in the rural sector, the Fox administration
spent more than the previous five PRI administrations (Ardila 2006). The spending was
mostly concentrated on the Northern areas of the country, where agricultural entrepreneurs
easily fulfilled the requirements to receive governmental support and where coincidentally
the PAN has had more political sympathizers (see Soto (2003) for a discussion).
One significant difference or commonalty –depending one’s view– from the previous
presidential campaigns was the PAN’s adoption of old PRI’s media tactics. In 2006, the
use of the media by the governing party to breed a “fear of change” mimic, to some degree,
those used by the PRI during the 1994 presidential campaign. The PAN, which severely
questioned the PRI’s use of state resources to guarantee privileged access to the media
and the loyalty of unions, resorted to similar tactics. However, once in power, the PAN
spent a considerable amount of resources in order to finance a campaign against the PRD
candidate that portrayed him as a destabilizing element who would threaten social peace
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and economic stability. For the second time in Mexico’s modern political history, the PAN
won the presidency with 36% of the vote closely followed by the PRD with 35% of the
popular mandate and, for the first time in its history, the PRI came in third, with 22% of
the vote.
Even though each election is unique and there are no definite or absolute regional parti-
san strongholds (as Figure 2 shows), the PAN tends to do better in the richer states, while
the PRD does better in the poorer states and the PRI seems to do better in a potpourri of
rich and poor states. The electoral results since 1994 reveal that collapsing multiple states
into large regions entails significant loss of information that otherwise may uncover sharper
and quite revealing differences between states. In other words, there is more variation be-
tween states than is suggested by the convention of the day. One way to account for this
variation between states, going beyond the inclusion of indicator variables for each state, is
to use multilevel modeling.
3 Methods
There are two compelling reasons for a multilevel approach. First, there is a theoretical
justification based on Mexico’s unique democratic transition. Second there is a statistical
justification; multilevel modeling allows us to understand the relation between income and
vote among individuals and states simultaneously.
The Mexican states have played an important role in Mexico’s transition to democracy,
which began in the late 1970s with the first comprehensive electoral reform (Lujambio
& Segl 2000, Ochoa-Reza 2004). In the following decades, as multiparty participation
increased across the 31 states and Mexico City, a new political dynamic was generated.
Political activity at the state and local levels was not only essential for a smooth change in
the Mexican political climate, but also created a set of state and local political conditions
that in turn gave rise to unique political cultures that need to be modeled (for a discussion,
see De Remes 1998, Hernandez-Rodriguez 2003, Loaeza 1999).
Multilevel modeling allows us to estimate patterns of variation within and between
groups (in this case, states), taking into account the hierarchical nature of the data (indi-
viduals within states) and also the specific characteristics of each state by allowing their
intercepts and slopes to vary (See, e.g., Snijders & Bosker (1999) for a general overview
of multilevel models, and Gelman et al. (2007) for the particular example of income and
voting.).
Our central model is a varying-intercept, varying-slope model predicting vote choice from
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individual income and GDP per capita, which we fit independently to data from Mitofsky
International for 1994, Consulta Mitofsky-Televisa for 2000 and BGC Ulises Beltra´n y
Asocs. for 2006 excluding those respondents who did not report for whom they voted or
who supported parties other than the PAN, PRI, or PRD. This left us with 4,213 responses
for 1994, 24,584 for 2000 and 3,709 for 2006 with sample sizes within states ranging from 9
in Tlaxcala and Colima in the year 2000 to 736 in Estado de Mexico in 1994. The multilevel
model allows us to estimate the income-voting relation in each state, with the estimates for
the larger states coming largely from their own data and the estimates for smaller states
relying more of the state-level regression model.11
The model for individual voters i is
Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i] + βj[i]xi), for i = 1, . . . , n, (1)
where Pr(yi = 1) represents the probability of voting for a particular party (PRD, PRI,
or PAN), and xi represents household income on a standardized scale.12 Given the unique
nature of each presidential election we fit two different logistic regressions: PAN vs PRI for
1994 and 2000 and PAN vs PRD for 2006. These models allow us to predict the vote for
the parties of the right and the left that had real chances to win the election.
Since we are interested in comparing states with different wealth, we include GDP per
capita within each state as a state-level predictor. The group-level intercepts and slopes
are modeled as,
αj = γα0 + γ
α
1 uj + ²
α





1 uj + ²
β
j , for j = 1, . . . , 32, (2)
where uj is the GDP per capita in state j, and the errors ²αj , ²
β
j have mean 0, variances σ
2
α,
σ2β, and correlation ρ, all of which are estimated from the data when combined with the
individual model. We also let the general levels for the intercepts and slopes (the parameters
γα0 and γ
β
0 ) vary by region (north, center-west, center, south, and Mexico City), so that the
model allows systematic variation by region and among states within regions.
In addition, we examine the estimated intercepts αj and slopes βj when including other
predictors: sex, age, the type of locality (urban or rural), the main reason for voting they
11More specifically, each estimated state-level coefficient in a multilevel model is a weighted average of
the unpooled estimate for the state and the completely pooled estimate using individual and state-level
predictors.
12The survey had seven minimum-wage income categories (in pesos per month for 2000 and 2006 and five
minimum-wage income categories for 1994).We coded these as 1–7 and then standardized by subtracting the
mean and dividing by two standard deviations (Gelman 2007).
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voted,13 and education.
For the logistic models (1), positive slopes βj correspond to richer voters being more
likely to support the PAN candidate. We summarize the models by plotting the curves
logit−1(αj + βjx) (for the logistic models) for each of the 32 states, and by plotting the
estimated intercepts αj and estimated slopes βj vs. uj , the state-level GDP per capita.
We fit the models using the lmer function in R (R Development Core Team 2006, Bates
2005), following the approach of Gelman et al. (2007).
4 Results
We first present the results of fitting the logistic model (1) predicting vote choice (PAN
vs. PRI for 1994 and 2000 and PAN vs. PRD for 2006) given individual income. Figure
3 shows the vote share plotted vs. individual income for each party and the average fitted
lines from the multilevel model by election year for the richest, medium, and poorest states
and for DF (Mexico City).
In 1994, the line for the poorest states tends to be steeper. This means that rich
voters residing in the 10 poorest states (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tlaxcala, Zacatecas, Michoacan,
Guerrero, Veracruz, Puebla, Hidalgo, and Nayarit) were more likely to vote for the PAN
candidate than similar voters residing in rich states. In the 2000 presidential election the
line for the poorest states (Chiapas, Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Michoacan,
Nayarit, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Tabasco) also tends to be steeper than the line of DF, the
richest “state” but slightly less than the line for the 10 richest states. In 2006, contrary to
the convention of the day, poor voters residing in the 10 poorest states (Chiapas, Oaxaca,
Zacatecas, Guerrero, Tlaxcala, Michoacan, Nayarit, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Tabasco) were
more likely to vote for the PAN candidate than poor voters residing in DF. This pattern
is reversed, however, at higher levels of income where richer voters in poor states are lees
likely to vote for the PAN than richer voters in DF.
When we take a closer look at each presidential election we uncover very interesting
patterns. Figures 4, 5, and 6 show the logistic regression line of income predicting vote
choice (PAN versus PRI for 1994 and 2000 and PAN versus PRD for 2006) for each state
ordered from poorest to richest in terms of their GDP. Overall, in 1994 and 2000 the logistic
regression lines seem to be steeper in the poorest states than in richer states. In 2006,
however, there is no clear pattern between states, that is, in some poor states the regression
13We include the reason for voting because of its relevance in determining vote choice, as mentioned in
Section 1.
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Figure 3: Left column: percentage of Mexicans at different income levels who voted for the
conservative PAN and its main opposition on the left (the PRI or PRD), in the past three
presidential elections. The conservative party consistently does better among richer voters.
Right column: estimated probability of voting for the conservative candidate, as a function
of income, in poor, middle-income, and rich states, with the capital (Mexico, D.F.) shown
separately. As in the United States, the difference in voting between high and low incomes
has tended to be less in richer states.
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lines tend to be steeper than in some richer states (compare Chiapas versus Nuevo Leon)
in contrast, in other states the contrary is true (see for example Oaxaca and DF).
Our next step is to add gender, age, type of locality, the reason for voting and educa-
tion (see Appendix 1). The coefficients for individual and state-level income show similar
patterns as before, so for the remaining analyses we only use income and GDP per capita
as predictors, since we are interested in studying the differences between the aﬄuent and
less aﬄuent voters. Even if the effects of income and GDP per capita had been explained
by other predictors, the correlations would still be real, in the sense of representing real
differences between rich and poor voters, and rich and poor states.
Now, to ascertain if income matters more in poor states than in rich states just as in the
U.S., we plot the estimated state intercepts and slopes as a function of the average state
GDP per capita. To explore these results further, we display in Figure 7 the intercept αj
and the slope βj for the 32 states including Mexico City,14 plotted vs. state GDP.
On average, richer states have higher intercepts and lower slopes than poor states (with
the pattern especially clear outside of Mexico City, which is a clear outlier as the richest
state, with voting patterns more typical of poorer areas).
The higher intercepts tell us that a voter of average income is more likely to support
the conservative candidate if he or she lives in a richer state. Thus, the differences between
rich and poor states are not simply aggregates of differences in individual incomes.
The slopes (see the right-hand side of 7) show that, similarly to the U.S. (see Figure
5 in Gelman et al. (2007)), income matters more in poorer states than in richer states.
Poor voters in poorer states are expected to vote at higher rates for the PRD and PRI (the
parties on the “left”) than poor voters in richer states. This can be seen in Figures 4, 5,
6, where, proportionally, more of the poor voters support the PRD and PRI in Chiapas,
Oaxaca, Zacatecas, Guerrero, and Tlaxcala, than in Chihuahua, Quintana Roo, Campeche,
Nuevo Leon, and Mexico City.
Considering all three major parties, we have found a positive correlation between income
and conservative voting. Moreover, this relationship is, on average, stronger in poorer states
than in richer states. Surprisingly, this pattern is most evident in 1994 and 2000 with quite
a bit of variation between states regarding the role of income in predicting the vote during
the 2006 presidential election. This finding is puzzling because, going back to the discussion
of the particular circumstances under which each election took place, the expectation would
14As noted earlier, we consider Mexico City as its own region in the multilevel model, thus allowing its


































































































































































Figure 4: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting
vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRI (excluding PRD) for the 1994 presidential
election.
For each state, the dark and light lines show the estimated regression line (based on the
posterior median of the coefficients). The circles show the relative proportion of individuals
in each income category in the survey. The area of each circle is proportional to the number

































































































































































Figure 5: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting
vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRI (excluding PRD) for the 2000 presidential
election.
For each state, the dark and light lines show the estimated regression line (based on the
posterior median of the coefficients). The circles show the relative proportion of individuals
in each income category in the survey. The area of each circle is proportional to the number
of respondents it represents. 15
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Figure 6: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting
vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRD (excluding PRI) for the 2006 presidential
election.
For each state, the dark and light lines show the estimated regression line (based on the
posterior median of the coefficients). The circles show the relative proportion of individuals
in each income category in the survey. The area of each circle is proportional to the number
of respondents it represents. 16
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Figure 7: Estimated state intercepts αj and slopes βj for the 32 states including Mexico
City plotted vs. state income by election year.
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be the opposite: the role of income in predicting the vote in the 1994 and 2000 elections
should be less important across states. In addition, the absolute levels of the slope are much
higher for 1994 and 2000 in comparison to the 2006 election (compare the vertical axes of
the two graphs in Figure 7), indicating that income is a stronger predictor of PAN vote
than PRI/PRD vote. This is a subtlety of the multiparty system, in which the three major
parties are not aligned on a single dimension.
5 Discussion
We have found the following patterns:
1. Rich states tend to support the conservative party (the PAN) at higher rates than
poor states, an opposite pattern from that found in the United States. There are
no definite or absolute regional partisan strongholds; that is, there is more variation
between states and within regions than what current literature may suggest.
2. In all states, the PAN does better among higher-income voters, but poor voters in
richer states tend to support the PAN at higher rates than poor voters in poorer
states. That is, income is less important as a predictor in rich states than in poor
states.
As previous studies have shown geography plays an important role in the socialization
of voters and in the political activities undertaken by political parties (see for example
Baybeck and McLurg 2005). The results of this paper suggest that, even after taking into
account individual level characteristics, similar people in terms of income voted differently
in different states.
These findings raise questions about the explanatory power of previous interpretations
of voting patterns in Mexico’s presidential elections such as the North v. South cultural
divide. Why do rich states –particularly non-Northern states– tend to support the PAN at
higher rates than poor states? And why rich voters in poorer states are more likely to vote
for the PAN than rich votes in richer states? Answering these questions fully goes beyond
the scope of this paper; however, based on our empirical results we venture some plausible
explanations that may help frame future debates.
5.1 Why is the predictive power of income uneven across states?
The explanation for the weak effect of income as a predictor of PAN in certain states that
relies on the difference in the North- South political culture does not seem to hold. As we
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saw in Figures 4, 5, 6 income as a predictor of vote choice for the PAN does better in states
that have been characterized as the models of the Northern entrepreneurial culture such as
Coahuila, Chihuahua and even Nuevo Leo´n in certain elections than in Aguascalientes or
Quere´taro. In order to be able to answer the larger puzzle of the unevenness of income as
a predictor across states, two sets of questions need to be addressed. First, those questions
pertaining to the stronger performance of income as a predictor in poor states (Why do
poor voters in poor states vote more for the leftist party and why do rich voters living in
poor states are more likely to vote for the conservative party that in some rich states?).
Second, those questions referring to the weaker effect on income on rich states. These
questions should be addressed separately because whereas the stronger effect of income on
vote choice in poor states is driven by both the rich and the poor, the weaker effect of income
in many rich states is primarily driven by poor voters15. We can draw some analogies and
interesting comparisons with the patterns found in the United States, where income is much
more predictive of voting in poor states than in rich states (Gelman et al. 2007, Gelman
et al. 2008) that may be useful for understanding these phenomenon.
5.2 Why is income a better predictor in poor states in Mexico?
One plausible explanation has to do with each state’s unequal social and economic struc-
tures. Recent growth has not been shared equally by all social groups, economic regions
or even states within them (OECD 2003, p.31). Poorer states in Mexico tend to be more
unequal than richer states. The presence of high inequality may influence people in higher
income brackets to become more conscious of their own “class” position in terms of income
and interests and this might lead them to vote in favor of the PAN candidate.
The voting patterns that are observed in the poor states in Mexico can be explained
in a similar manner than voting patterns in the poor states of the US. Poor states are
concentrated in the Southern region and have similar characteristics: rural, poor and with
a similar history derived from the fact that many Mexican poor Southern States concentrate
the largest proportion of indigenous population. Similarly to what V.O. Key observed in
1949 in Southern Politics regarding the “black belt” elites, ethnicity has been a main source
of unity for the rich and poor voters in Mexico’s “indigenous belt”. Social class as an ethnic
cleavage coincides in most of Mexicos poor states. This de facto group membership will
15Comparing for example the wealthiest in Chiapas and the wealthiest or even middle income in states
like Quere´taro or Aguascalientes, the rich in the rich states are still more likely to vote for the PAN, even if
the predictive power of income is weaker in Quere´taro, Aguascalientes or a middle income state like Colima
or San Luis Potos´ı.
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translate into political cohesion, which would be more evident when group members have
something real to loose (i.e. elites in the South had more to loose from the leftist policies
the PRD candidate promised to implement in the 2006 election campaign if he became
elected President. See Sears & Funk (1991)) In a similar vein, in terms of GDP per capita,
poorer states on average, tend to be more rural and slightly more conservative than richer
states. Individuals in poorer states especially the wealthy may be more conservative on
average than those wealthy individuals in rich states who may be less conservative and
more cosmopolitan, hence, the PAN electoral platform may be more appealing for rich
voters living in poorer states than for rich voters living in more cosmopolitan richer states.
5.3 Rich states in Mexico, Rich states in the US
On average, the variation in slopes appears to be less in Mexico than in the United States:
when it comes to income and voting, the poorer Mexican states look like the poorest states
in the U.S. (e.g., Mississippi), whereas the richer Mexican states look like middle-income
U.S. states (e.g., Ohio). Similarly to the US, voting patterns in rich states in Mexico tend
to have less correlation with income. Yet, the comparison that was helpful between poor
states in both countries does not offer any leverage in the case of rich states. These states
are concentrated in the Northeast of the US, whereas the richest states in Mexico are from
various regions. As we have noted the most wealthy states are not so concentrated in the
North (DF, Quintana Roo, Aguascalientes, Quere´taro, Campeche).
Even if we focused only on the region, there aren’t many shared features the wealthiest
regions of both countries. Mexican Northern states have more in common with US Southern
states in terms of their tense relationship with the political center –Mexico City– than
with the industrial North of the US. From the 1970’s onwards, Northern elites in Mexico
frequently complained about the political and economic oppression that was being exercised
from the center. They complained about national redistribution schemes of the PRI, which
extracted fiscal resources from the North and redistributed them in a manner that favored
the industrial development of the Mexico City and its surrounding areas. The discontent
of party members of this region grew stronger as they felt they had no autonomy, nor great
support, from Mexico City party elites. It was in part as a result of these political and
economic center-periphery tensions that high-income voters and politicians of this region
broke-off from the PRI and joined the PAN; the party that from its beginnings advocated
states rights and fiscal conservatism (Loaeza 1999). Perhaps, the only rich state in Mexico
comparable to the US Northeastern rich states (in terms of a similar history and place in the
20
political system) would be Mexico City, the old industrial and urban heart of the country.
However, one interesting comparison between rich states in Mexico and in the US with
regard to the characteristics of the voters responsible for weakening the effect or flatten-
ing the slope that relates income and vote choice is that in rich Mexican states such as
Aguascalientes and Quere´taro, particularly the former, income appears to be completely
uncorrelated with vote preferences. In Connecticut this is explained by rich voters voting
increasingly for the Democratic party. In Aguascalientes, the voters that seem to be driving
this effect are poor voters voting for the conservative party. If most of the poor voters from
rich states were concentrated in the North, perhaps we could use the polarization of Mexico
hypothesis to explain it through a “regional political culture” type of explanation, but this
leaves out half of the rich states. Moreover, these types of explanations are weakened by
the fact that the predictive power of income on vote choice declined in the 2006 election
with respect to the previous ones. Besides these two cases, overall, it remains puzzling why
poor voters in many rich states who in previous elections had overwhelmingly preferred
the PRI, in the 2006 elections voted for the conservative party. One plausible explanation
may be given by Huber & Stanig (2007) who using comparative data show that poor voters
may not vote for the party on the left, in this case the PRD, even though that this would
potentially represent a benefit in terms of redistributive policies simply because they care
much more about other social issues than about redistribution.
Overall, our analysis shows that richer states tend to support the PAN candidate at
higher rates than poorer states. However, by applying multilevel modeling techniques we
were able to show that there is much more variation between states than when they are
collapsed in large regions. Moreover, while income is positively related with the PAN vote
as previous analyses have shown, its impact seems to be stronger within poorer states than
within medium and richer states. The question of “What’s the matter with Me´xico?” can
be narrowed down to “What’s the matter with states like Quere´taro, Aguascalientes and
San Luis Potos´ı?”. It is in these states where there are no obvious reasons or theories
attempting an explanation of why poor voters prefer the PAN. This puzzle remains for
future research to engage in as providing an explanation goes beyond the scope of this
article. Nevertheless, the main aim as to examine the priors of the previous literature and
provide the tools to engage in a dialogue with those who posit more historical-institutionalist
explanations of the voting patterns has been fulfilled. The results and the methodological
tool presented here should be useful for other researchers interested in examining existing
hypotheses regarding these phenomenon in the more qualitative Mexican scholarship such
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as the uneven collapse of the PRI’s regime (Hernandez-Rodriguez 2003, ?) a strong party
identification of Conservative Catholics with the PAN (Moreno 2003) or the social forces








Income x GDP -0.52 0.25
Number obs: 4,213 AIC=5,346 DIC=5,326
Table 1: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting









Income X GDP -0.43 0.24
Number obs: 4,164 AIC = 5,206 DIC=5,179
Table 2: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i] + βj[i]xi) of income, gender,
age, and education predicting vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRI (excluding







Income X GDP -0.27 0.22
Number obs: 24,584 AIC = 31,480 DIC= 31,460
Table 3: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting










Income X GDP 0.01 0.19
Number obs: 24,446 AIC = 30,439 DIC=30,411
Table 4: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i] + βj[i]xi) of income, gen-
der, age, education, and urban predicting vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRI







Income X GDP 0.30 0.37
Number obs: 3,709 AIC = 4,546 DIC= 4,526
Table 5: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i]+βj[i]xi) of income predicting










Income X GDP 0.35 0.37
Number obs: 3,661 AIC = 4,465 DIC= 4,437
Table 6: Estimated regression lines Pr(yi = 1) = logit−1(αj[i] + βj[i]xi) of income, gender,
age, education, and urban predicting vote choice: for the PAN compared to the PRD
(excluding PRI) for the 2006 presidential election.
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